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Real Estate Tax Exemption For Federally Subsidized
Low-Income Housing Corporations: Rio Vista
Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. County of
Ramsey
The Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corporation (Rio Vista)
was organized to provide low-rent housing for families of mod-
est income. The federal government subsidized Rio Vista's
construction costs' and continues to subsidize part of its rental
income.2 From 1974 to 1976, Rio Vista paid real estate taxes on
its property in accordance with a special provision of Minne-
sota law, which requires that housing for low- and moderate-in-
come families be assessed at only twenty percent of market
value.3 After paying taxes for the first half of 1976, Rio Vista
brought an action to recover these taxes on the ground that it
was a tax-exempt charity. The trial court denied recovery by
ruling that Rio Vista did not qualify for a tax exemption be-
1. The federal government insured the $829,900 loan that Rio Vista used to
finance construction costs and the acquisition of land, pursuant to section 236
of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976). See Rio Vista Non-Profit
Hous. Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 187, 188 (Minn. 1979).
2. Rental income was financed under two federal programs: the Rent
Supplement Program, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 101, 12
U.S.C. § 1701s (1976) and section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-1 (1976). The Rent Supplement Program requires eligible tenants to ex-
pend no more than 25% of their income for rent. For the eligibility require-
ments of the program, see 12 U.S.C. § 1701s(c) (1976). The section 236 program
requires eligible tenants to pay rent equal to 25% of their income or the "basic
rent," whichever is greater, so long as that amount does not exceed the "fair
market rent." "Basic rent" is determined according to payments of principal on
the loan and of the one percent interest; "fair market rent" is determined from
payments of principal, interest, and mortgage insurance. Rio Vista Non-profit
Hous. Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d at 188. According to the section
236 formula, in 1975 the basic rent of a two-bedroom apartment was $165; the
"fair market rent" was $246. Id. at 188 n.1. To qualify for payments of monthly
rent below the "fair market rent," a tenant's annual family income must not ex-
ceed certain amounts. Id. at 188 n.2. A tenant must also meet one of the follow-
ing requirements:
(1) Be a member of a family of two or more persons ... who occupy
the same unit; (2) a single person, 62 years of age or older; (3) physi-
cally handicapped; (4) a single person under 62 years of age, provided
that no more than 10 percent of the available apartments are rented to
such persons; or (5) a displacee.
Id. at 188-89 n.2.
3. See MIN STAT. § 273.13(17) (1978).
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cause it was not an institution of purely public charity.4 On ap-
peal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding, that the
corporation was an institution of purely public charity and
therefore was entitled to an exemption from real estate taxa-
tion. Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey,
277 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Minn. 1979).
Although the Minnesota Legislature has given municipali-
ties the power to levy property taxes,5 that power is subject to
constitutional and statutory provisions exempting certain prop-
erty from taxation.6 One such exemption applies to institutions
of purely public charity.7 This exemption confers an indirect
subsidy8 and is usually justified as the quid pro quo for chari-
ties undertaking functions and services that the state would
otherwise be required to perform.9 Some courts, in an effort to
better articulate the rationale for the charitable exemption,
have asserted that the exemption exists not only because chari-
ties perform functions that relieve the state of a duty to provide
services, but also because charities conduct activities that fur-
ther socially desirable objectives of the community.10 Under
this broader rationale, the benefits that accrue to the commu-
nity are thought to offset the loss of revenue that results from
exemption." Consistent with these justifications, the Minne-
4. 277 N.W.2d at 189.
5. See, e.g., Minm. STAT. § 412.251 (1978).
6. See MIm. CONST. art. 10, § 1; Mum. STAT. § 272.02 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
7. Minnesota's constitution provides that, "[t]axes shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects and shall be levied and collected for public purposes,
but ... institutions of purely public charity ... shall be exempt from taxation
except as provided in this section." MIN. CONST. art. 10, § 1. The exemption
for purely public charities is codified in MmN. STAT. § 272.02(1) (6) (1978 & Supp.
1979). (The Rio Vista opinion inaccurately cites this provision as MINN. STAT.
§ 272.02(6) (1978).)
8. See Hilbert, Illinois Property Tax Exemptions: A Call for Reform, 25
DE PAUL L. REV. 585, 586, 599 (1976); Stimson, The Exemption of Property from
Taxation in the United States, 18 Mim. L. REv. 411, 412 (1934).
9. E. Fscm, D. FREED & E. SCHAcHTER, CHARms AND CHA=TABLE FoUN-
DATIONS 602 (1974). See John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pac.
Grove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 372, 382, 103 Cal. Rptr. 215, 222 (1972); Lutheran Home,
Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 211 Kan. 270, 277, 505 P.2d 1118, 1124 (1973);
Camping & Educ. Foundation v. State, 282 Minn. 245, 252-53, 164 N.W.2d 369, 374
(1969); Note, Taxation: Charitable Institutions: Effect of Tax Exemptions in
Defining a Charity, 23 CoiRaE.L L.Q., 170, 171 (1938).
10. See Stockton Civic Theatre v. Board of Supervisors, 66 Cal. 2d 13, 19-20,
423 P.2d 810, 815, 56 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1967); Central Bd. on Care of Jewish
Aged, Ino. v. Henson, 120 Ga. App. 627, 629, 171 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1969); E. FiscH,
D. FREED & E. ScHAc=R, supra note 9, at 603.
11. See John Tennant Memorial Homes, Inc. v. City of Pac. Grove, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 372, 382, 103 Cal. Rptr. 215, 222 (1972); People ex rel. Redfern v.
Hopewell Farms, 9 IIl. App. 3d 16, 17, 291 N.E.2d 288, 290 (1972); Camping &
Educ. Foundation v. State, 282 Minn. 245, 252-53, 164 N.W.2d 369, 374 (1967).
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sota Supreme Court has exempted organizations engaged in
caring for the sick, aged, and infirm, 12 educating young peo-
ple,13 operating facilities that promote the moral and educa-
tional welfare of youth,14 providing hospital care for the poor,'5
and providing religious education.16
A liberal construction of exemption provisions results in
the loss of a major source of municipal revenue' 7 and places a
greater burden on nonexempt taxpayers,18 thus, these provi-
12. See Assembly Homes, Inc. v. Yellow Medicine County, 273 Minn. 197,
204, 140 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1968) (holding nursing home exempt from taxation).
13. See Junior Achievement, Inc. v. State, 271 Minn. 385, 392, 135 N.W.2d
881, 886 (1965) (holding exempt property used by a corporation to educate
young people on the function of the American free enterprise system).
14. See Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 554-62, 38
N.W.2d 803, 808-12 (1949). (Christian laymen's organization that operates youth
center to bring youth under religious influence is entitled to exemption).
15. See Mayo Foundation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 306 Minn. 25, 37-38,
236 N.W.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (medical clinic and foundation organized and op-
erated for exclusively charitable and educational purposes held exempt);
County of Hennepin v. Brotherhood of Church of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460,
462, 8 N.W. 595, 596 (1881) (hospital that cared for all without regard to ability to
pay held exempt as purely public charity).
Public hospitals are explicitly exempted in both MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1,
and MuIN. STAT. § 272.02(1) (3) (1978 & Supp. 1979). Similar institutions that do
not qualify as public hospitals may nonetheless be considered under the
broader category of purely public charities. See Mayo Foundation v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 306 Minn. at 37-38, 236 N.W.2d at 773-74.
16. See County of Hennepin v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 504-05, 8 N.W. 761, 762
(1881) (holding exempt parochial school providing religious education without
remuneration). Exemptions for "all seminaries of learning, all churches,
church property, [and] houses of worship" are contained in MINN. CONST. art.
10, § 1, and are codified in MINN. STAT. § 272.02(1)(4)-(5) (1978 & Supp. 1979).
17. Property taxes are the most important source of municipal revenue.
For example, in 1970 to 1971 they comprised 64% of general revenue raised by
local governments. ADVISORY COMM'N OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
PROPERTY TAx IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 99 (1974). In 1972, 84% of all local
tax revenue and 36.4% of all local government revenue from all sources came
from property taxes. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 242, 245 (1974). See also E. FISCH, D.
FREED & E. SCHACIrER, supra note 9, at 599-60. ("Property taxes are an impor-
tant source of revenue for governmental subdivisions which are finding it in-
creasingly difficult to obtain adequate funds." (footnote omitted)); 0. OLDMAN
& F. SCHOETrLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXEs AND FINANCE 137 (1974) ("As a produ-
cer of revenue, the property tax ranks second only to the federal personal in-
come tax... ."); Cypen, Access to Health Care Services for the Poor- Existing
Programs and Limitations, 31 U. MIAM L. REV. 127, 152 (1976) ('To freely allow
tax exemptions would ... inevitably result in the depletion of sources of reve-
nue from taxation."); Note, Nebraska Supreme Court Approves State Property
Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Nursing Home Corporation Closely Associated
with For-Profit Corporations, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1979) ('"The ra-
tio of tax exempt property to taxable property is steadily increasing. Because
of the resulting loss of tax revenues, local government subdivisions cast a jaun-
diced eye upon property tax exemptions.").
18. See Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 728, 192 So. 211, 216
[Vol. 64:10941096
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sions have generally been strictly construed.19 For the same
reasons parties seeking an exemption bear the burden of prov-
ing their entitlement to it.20 The doctrine of strict construction
and the difficulties taxpayers have in bearing the burden of
proof explain why taxation has been the rule and exemption
has been the exception.2 1 In some jurisdictions, however, the
doctrine of strict construction has been eroding. Courts in
these jurisdictions pay "lip service" to the doctrine but fail to
apply it to exemption provisions. 22
Courts generally use a vague definition of charity when de-
ciding charitable exemption cases. 23 The Minnesota Supreme
(1939); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 185 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965); Hartt, Ad Valorem Taxes
and Non-Profit Health-Care Facilities, 39 TEx. B.J. 864, 865 (1976).
19. See Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Allphin, 63 Ill. 2d 305, 310, 347 N.E.2d 729, 731
(1976); Iowa Movers & Warehousemen's Ass'n v. Briggs, 237 N.W.2d 759, 769-70
(Iowa), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976); Topeka Cemetery Ass'n v.
Schnellbacher, 218 Kan. 39, 41-42, 542 P.2d 278, 281 (1975); Abex Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxation, 295 Minn. 445, 451-52, 207 N.W.2d 37, 41-42 (1973); Camp-
ing & Educ. Foundation v. State, 282 Minn. 245, 250, 164 N.W.2d 369, 372 (1969);
American Ry. Express Co. v. Holm, 169 Minn. 323, 325, 211 N.W. 467, 467 (1926);
Koner v. Procaccino, 39 N.Y.2d 258, 264, 347 N.E.2d 658, 661, 383 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299
(1976). But see Book Agents of the Methodist Episcopal Church, S. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 513 S.W.2d 514, 521 (Tenn. 1974).
The rule of strict constuction in favor of taxation should not be confused
with the rule that when a statute is capable of two constructions and the intent
of the legislature is in doubt, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the tax-
payer. See, e.g., American Ry. Express Co. v. Holm, 169 Minn. 323, 325, 211 N.W.
467, 467 (1926).
20. See First Nat'l Bank v. State Property Tax Appeal Bd., 60 IM. App. 3d
810, 812, 377 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1978); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y
v. Board of Review, 267 N.W.2d 413,414 (Iowa 1978); Federal Land Bank v. State,
274 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (N.D. 1979); In re Middiebury College Sales & Use Tax,
137 Vt. 28, 32, 400 A.2d 965, 967 (1979); Sisters of St. Mary v. City of Madison, 89
Wis. 2d 372, 378, 278 N.W.2d 814, 817 (1979).
21. See Dow City Senior Citizens Hous., Inc. v. Board of Review, 230
N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1975); Camping & Educ. Foundation v. State, 282 Minn.
245, 250, 164 N.W.2d 369, 372 (1969); Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 85
Wis. 2d 447, 456, 271 N.W.2d 362, 366 (1978); Note, Rental Housing for the Elderly
as a Tax Exempt Charity and Retention of the No Partial Exemption Rule, 44
Mo. L. REv. 154, 156 n.13 (1979).
22. See Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 44 Cal. App.
3d 23, 27-28, 118 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1974); Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of
Synod, Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 262 (Fla. 1970); Town of Gilford v. State Tax
Comm'n, 108 N.H. 167, 168-69, 229 A.2d 691, 693 (1967); Note, supra note 21, at
156-57 (citing Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax
Comm'n, 522 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. 1975)).
23. One of the definitions of charity, widely quoted and approved by Amer-
ican courts, states:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be... defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number
of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffer-
10971980]
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Court, however, uses a six-factor standard-the North Star
test-to evaluate the charitable nature of an organization:
(1) whether the stated purpose of the undertaking is to be helpful to
others without immediate expectation of material reward; (2) whether
the entity involved is supported by donations and gifts in whole or in
part; (3) whether the recipients of the 'charity' are required to pay for
the assistance received in whole or in part; (4) whether the income re-
ceived from gifts and donations and charges to users produces a profit
to the charitable institution; (5) whether the beneficiaries of the 'char-
ity' are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, whether the class of
persons to whom the charity is made available is one having a reason-
able relationship to the charitable objectives; (6) whether dividends, in
form or substance, or assets upon dissolution are available to private
interest.2 4
In Rio Vista, the court applied the North Star test and de-
termined that all six factors of the test had been satisfied.25
The stipulated facts2 6 of the case easily justified this finding
with respect to the first, fourth, and sixth factors. The first fac-
tor was satisfied because Rio Vista's bylaws and articles of in-
corporation indicated that the corporation was formed for a
charitable purpose.27 The fourth factor was moot since Rio
Vista had experienced deficits from 1974 to 1976.28 The sixth
factor was satisfied because Rio Vista's articles of incorporation
ing or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or
by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise les-
sening the burdens of government.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867). For examples of cases
quoting this definition, see DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir.
1962); Gossett v. Swinney, 53 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1931); Bok v. McCaughn, 42
F.2d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1930); American Water Works Ass'n v. Board of Assess-
ment Appeals, 38 Colo. App. 341, 563 P.2d 359, 362 (1976); Raser v. Johnson, 9 Ill.
App. 375, 379, 132 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1956); Frisco Employes' Hosp. Ass'n v. State
Tax Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo. 1964).
24. North Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1, 6, 236
N.W.2d 754, 757 (1975).
25. Having decided that Rio Vista was an institution of purely public char-
ity, the court rejected the state's contention that MmN. STAT. 273.13(17) (1978),
which provides that title II housing for the elderly and for low- and moderate-
income families shall be assessed at 20 percent of market value, evidences a
legislative intent that such housing not be allowed a tax exemption. The court
reasoned that because the taxing statute, id. § 273.13(1), refers to property
"subject to a general property tax," it could not apply to the Rio Vista housing,
which was exempt from such tax as a charitable organization. The court found
further that MIN. STAT. § 272.02 (1978 & Supp. 1979), which provides exemp-
tions for institutions of purely public charity, is limited only by two provisions
of the Minnesota Statutes, sections 272.02 and 272.025, and that neither of these
provisions mention title II housing. If the legislature had meant to deny ex-
emption to such housing, the court concluded, those provisions would have
done so. 277 N.W.2d at 192.
26. 277 N.W.2d at 188-89.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id.
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precluded a distribution of assets to private persons upon dis-
solution.29
Rio Vista did not as easily satisfy the second, third, and
fifth factors of the North Star test. The court concluded that
Rio Vista met the second factor-that the entity is supported
by gifts and donations-even though the donations came solely
from the federal government rather than from private benefac-
tors. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on decisions
holding that organizations which provide federally subsidized
housing for the elderly or handicapped qualify for property tax
exemption. 30 The court concluded that Rio Vista met the third
factor-that recipients of the charity must not be required to
pay for the assistance received-even though the residents of
Rio Vista were required to pay partial rent. This conclusion
rested on the finding that the rent paid by Rio Vista tenants
was not a "major source of revenue" to the project since a siza-
ble portion of the total rent was paid by the federal govern-
ment.31 In applying the fifth factor, the court did not discuss
the requirement that there be a reasonable relationship be-
tween the class of beneficiaries and the charitable objectives.
Instead, it looked simply to whether the housing project less-
ened the burdens of government.3 2 The court found that Rio
Vista lessened the burdens of government, since without orga-
nizations such as Rio Vista the government might seek to im-
plement low-rent housing programs through government
agencies.33
The Rio Vista court's disposition of the second, third, and
fifth factors of the North Star test illustrates its willingness to
liberally construe the tax exemption statute and reject the
traditional rule of strict construction.3 4 Such a liberal construc-
tion is unjustified not only from a doctrinal standpoint but also
29. Id.
30. Id. at 191.
31. Id. at 191-92.
32. The court found the factor of the relationship between the class of ben-
eficiaries and the charitable objectives to be "intertwined" with the question
whether the exemption lessens the burdens of government. Id. at 191. The
court reached this conclusion on the basis of the definition of charity articu-
lated in a prior Minnesota case: "Charity is broadly defined as a gift, to be ap-
plied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, 'by... lessening the burdens of government."' Junior Achievement,
Inc. v. State, 271 Minn. 385, 390, 135 N.W.2d 881, 885 (1965) (quoting 15 Am. Jur.
2d Charities § 3).
33. 277 N.W.2d at 191.
34. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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as a matter of policy, because a liberal construction inequitably
increases the burden on municipal governments.
In determining that Rio Vista satisfied the second factor of
the North Star test, the court decided that governmental assist-
ance qualifies as a donation. In reaching this decision the court
relied on an analogy with government funding directed to the
elderly or handicapped. 35 Organizations providing care for the
elderly and handicapped, however, are unlike those that pro-
vide low-income housing; the former are traditional, recognized
charities, and the latter are not.36 Housing programs benefiting
the handicapped and elderly have been held exempt because
they supply essential physical and emotional services that the
beneficiaries cannot provide for themselves. 3 7 By contrast,
housing programs for low- and moderate-income families do
not supply the same services. Instead, such programs simply
enable the beneficiaries to live in somewhat better housing
than they could otherwise afford.38 To ignore the doctrine of
strict construction in this manner will certainly result in an un-
warranted increase in the number of institutions that qualify as
purely public charities.
The court's resolution of the third factor in favor of Rio
Vista is also indicative of the movement away from strict con-
struction. The court suggested that the federal government
provided the "major source of revenue to the project,"39 and
underemphasized the significant payments that Rio Vista ex-
acted from all recipients of its "charity." Even with the most
generous subsidy available under the applicable federal rent
subsidy programs, the tenant was required to pay at least
twenty-five percent of his income for rent or else face evic-
35. Id. at 190-91 (citing Banahan v. Presbyterian Hous. Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48
(Ky. 1977); Assembly Homes, Inc. v. Yellow Medicine County, 273 Minn. 197, 140
N.W.2d 336 (1966); Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax Comm'n, 566
S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978)).
36. The court, in fact, admitted that it had "never addressed the precise is-
sue" of the charitable nature of government-funded low- and moderate-income
housing. 277 N.W.2d at 190.
37. See, e.g., Banahan v. Presbyterian Hous. Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977)
(housing and related services specially designed to meet needs of aged and
handicapped); Assembly Homes, Inc. v. Yellow Medicine County, 273 Minn. 197,
140 N.W.2d 336 (1966) (housing and related facilities and services provided for
the elderly and mentally retarded); Franciscan Tertiary Province v. State Tax
Comm'n, 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978) (housing, social, and medical services for
the elderly). All of the above cases were cited by the Rio Vista court in sup-
port of its conclusion that the second factor was met.
38. See Metropolitan Pittsburgh Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Board of Prop-
erty Assessment, 480 Pa. 622, 628, 391 A.2d 1059, 1061-62 (1978).
39. 277 N.W.2d at 192.
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tion.40 Courts that have denied exemption to low-income hous-
ing projects premised their decisions on the amount of rent
tenants were obligated to contribute.4' The mode of analysis
employed by these courts is more appropriate; it focuses on the
issue of whether the recipients of a supposed charity are re-
quired to make substantial payments rather than confusing the
issue with a calculation of the major source of funds.4 More-
over, even if the Rio Vista court's general approach to the third
factor were appropriate, the application of the approach to the
facts of the case is incorrect. Rio Vista received more than half
its revenues from the rents paid by tenants. 43 The "major
source of revenue to the project" was therefore not the federal
government.
The fifth factor of the North Star test requires the court to
decide whether the restrictions, if any, on the class of people
benefited by the charity bear a "reasonable relationship to the
charitable objectives."44 The court in Rio Vista, however, chose
instead to evaluate whether the program "lessen [ed] the bur-
dens of government."45 Although the court concluded that Rio
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See Mountain View Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 N.M. 649, 427
P.2d 13 (1967); London Square Village, Inc. v. Oklahoma County Equalization &
Excise Bd., 559 P.2d 1224 (Okla. 1977); Metropolitan Pittsburgh Non-Profit Hous.
Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, 480 Pa. 622, 391 A.2d 1059 (1978).
42. Even in cases involving institutions that have required all recipients of
their benefits to pay, some courts have held the institutions to be of a charita-
ble nature and therefore exempt. The required payment, however, can only be
a nominal charge or an amount not commensurate with the benefits received.
See Memorial Hosp. v. Sparks, 9 Ariz. App. 478, 481-82, 453 P.2d 989, 992-93
(1969); Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. App. 2d 1, 12, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 242, 254 (1961). This authority is clearly not applicable to the facts of Rio
Vista given the substantial nature of the tenant's payment for rent. See note 43
infra.
43. Rio Vista had gross revenues and benefits of $121,811.53 in the fiscal
year ending on June 30, 1976. This amount included $64,630.00 in tenant-paid
rent, $16,970.00 in federal rent supplement payments, and $40,211.53 in federal
interest reduction payments. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 15, Rio Vista
Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1979).
44. North Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1, 6, 236
N.W.2d 745, 757 (1975). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
45. 277 N.W.2d at 191. See note 32 supra. The court should not have en-
tirely slighted the reasonable relationship requirement even though in the
present case this factor was met. Madonna Towers v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion, 283 Minn. 111, 167 N.W.2d 712 (1969), illustrates the need for such a re-
quirement. In Madonna Towers, the court recognized that the home for the
elderly, although claiming to be charitable, "Would provide the good life for eld-
erly people who [could] afford it." Id. at 117, 167 N.W.2d at 715 (emphasis ad-
ded). The court withheld the exemption, noting that "[i]f the financing of the
operation is to be successful, the patronage of the indigent and unwell would
not be sought or encouraged." Id. Rio Vista, however, satisfied the reasonable
relationship requirement The only restriction imposed was that a tenant be el-
1980] 1101
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Vista's activities lessened the burdens of government, the rea-
sons for the court's conclusion are not persuasive. First, it is
obvious that the burden on the federal government was not de-
creased by the existence of the Rio Vista housing program be-
cause, without the program, the federal government would not
have been under a duty to subsidize low- and moderate-income
renters.4 Second, it is mere speculation to assert, as the court
did, that the government would have implemented federally as-
sisted housing programs if private organizations did not.47
Most importantly, however, the court failed to recognize that
charitable property tax exemptions actually increase, rather
than diminish, the burden on municipal governments.
The court's failure to recognize the increased burden that
this extension of the charitable exemption places on municipal
governments is a result of the court's failure to differentiate be-
tween the abstract concept of government-that of a monolithic
unit-and the form government takes in reality-a hierarchical
collection of diverse and often competing units. Extending the
charitable property tax exemption to federally subsidized hous-
ing may well lessen the aggregate burden on federal, state, and
local governments, but it will almost always have an adverse ef-
fect on municipal governments. As tax-exempt housing enters
a municipality, the municipality's tax base will not increase
with the demand for municipally financed services.48 Thus, the
grant of total tax-exempt status to low- and moderate-income
housing projects forces municipalities to subsidize these orga-
igible for either the Rent Supplement Program or section 236 of the National
Housing Act. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 16, Rio Vista Non-Profit Hous.
Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1979). This restriction was
consistent with the company's objective of providing adequate housing to those
who could not otherwise have afforded it. See 277 N.W.2d at 188, 190.
46. The court dismissed the trial court's finding that, because federal funds
were spent, the burdens of government were increased. The supreme court
reasoned that this finding was relevant only to the resolution of the second fac-
tor, which requires the court to decide whether the government subsidy should
be considered a donation. 277 N.W.2d at 191. Because the court considered the
fifth factor in terms of lessening the government's burdens, however, the in-
crease in government expenditures should have been recognized. See id.
47. Section two of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12
U.S.C. § 1701t (1976) states that in carrying out programs to meet the housing
needs of the nation's lower-income families, "there should be the fullest practi-
cable utilization of the resources and capabilities of private enterprise." Id.
The Act does not indicate that the federal government will implement the pro-
gram if private enterprise fails to do so.
48. In fact, the affected municipalities may suffer an erosion of their tax
base. See generally A. BALK, THE FREE is. PROPERTY WrrHour TAXEs 18-19
(1971); E. FINSCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACHTER, supra note 9, at 599-600.
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nizations by providing services.49 This forced subsidy under-
cuts the quid pro quo rationale5 0 for the charitable exemption;
the loss of tax revenue to the municipality is not offset by the
fact that the municipality need not provide a charitable service
for which it would normally be responsible. Furthermore, the
nonfinancial benefits associated with such housing projects ac-
crue not only to the municipalities in which they are situated,
but also to the surrounding region and even to the nation as a
whole.5 1
Of course, this pattern of enforced subsidization would not
be inequitable if the housing projects involved were randomly
distributed throughout the nation and if all municipalities
taxed property at similar rates. A disproportionate amount of
subsidized housing, however, is located in central cities.52
Thus, central city taxpayers must bear a greater proportion of
the burden created by subsidized housing than must their sub-
urban or rural counterparts. This misallocation is made even
more undesirable by the fact that most central cities are al-
ready compelled to impose significantly greater tax rates than
are the suburban municipalities that surround them.5 3
This inequitable allocation of costs could produce un-
49. See generally sources cited in note 8 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
51. Such projects help maximize the national goal of improving housing
conditions. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, § 2, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701t (1976) (expounding "national goal.., of 'a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family'") (emphasis added).
52. For instance, in the Minneapolis-St. Paul seven-county metropolitan
area, approximately 32% of the population (637,800) is located in the two cen-
tral cities, while 68% (1,351,020) is located in surrounding suburban areas. Tel-
ephone interview with James Hibbs, Office of State Demographer of Minnesota,
in St. Paul (Apr. 8, 1980). The distribution of federally subsidized section 236
housing, however, is the reverse of this pattern. 62% of the housing projects
within the metropolitan area are located in the central cities and 38% of the
projects are located in the suburbs. Furthermore, when the original mortgage
balances for section 236 housing projects are aggregated within each of these
two categories and the categories are compared, the disparity is even greater.
projects in the central cities account for 69% ($90,932,100) of the total original
mortgage balances, while suburban projects account for a mere 31%
($41,270,600). These statistics were compiled from Department of Housing and
Urban Development documents, which are on file with the Minnesota Law Re-
view.
53. The following table illustrates selected 1979 municipal property tax
rates, in mills per $1000 assessed valuation (mill rates), for the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area:
Central Cities Mill Rate
Minneapolis 43.421
St. Paul 36.242
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wanted results. Central cities with high tax rates that are un-
able to increase the tax rates for nonexempt properties to cover
the increased demand for services generated by tax-exempt
housing projects might be forced to cut back tax-financed serv-
ices.5 4 This result would conflict with the goal of federal hous-
ing programs: the improvement of both housing and its
environment. In addition, the increased municipal tax burden
caused by a property tax exemption for subsidized housing is
likely to lead municipalities to resist the construction of such
Selected Inner Suburbs Mill Rate
Bloomington 14.841
Brooklyn Center 17.880
Brooklyn Park 14.944
Edina 9.046
Falcon Heights 14.885
Golden Valley 15.764
Maplewood 19.792
Richfield 17.861
Robbinsdale 20.952
Roseville 13.722
St. Anthony 11.425
St. Louis Park 18.525
Selected Outer Suburbs Mill Rate
Afton 19.053
Arden Hills 8.819
Blaine 15.904
Chanhassen (Carver 17.670
County, urban)
Chaska (urban) 14.730
Deephaven 15.697
Medicine Lake 6.700
Mound 14.002
North Oaks 7.770
Orono 14.000
Wayzata 12.677
West St. Paul 19.952
White Bear Lake 15.414
Woodbury 17.850
This table was compiled from the following sources, all of which are on file with
the Minnesota Law Review: Anoka County, Anoka, Minn., Anoka County Serv-
ices and Information: Property Taxes Payable in 1979; Carver County, Chaska,
Minn., Mill rates for taxes payable in 1979; Dakota County, Hastings, Minn., Da-
kota County Tax Rates for Year 1979; Hennepin County, Minneapolis, Minn.,
Mill Rate Table: Tax Payable in 1979; Ramsey County, St. Paul, Minn., Mill
Rates for 1979 Property Taxes in Ramsey County; Washington County, Stillwa-
ter, Minn., For Payable 1979.
54. Since property taxes constitute "the main revenue source for some of
the most important collectively supplied goods and services," 0. OLDMAN & F.
SciOEirrE, supra note 17, at 137, a loss of property taxes could result in a loss
of services.
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housing within their borders.5 5
In deciding Rio Vista, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
joined the movement away from strict construction of the char-
itable exemption. This break from traditional principles, at
least in this context, is ill-advised. It places an even heavier
burden on the primary method of financing municipal serv-
ices-the property tax-than the legislature appears to have in-
tended.56 Given the precarious financial position of many
municipalities, the court should not have undertaken to read-
just the pattern of subsidy to the further detriment of munici-
pal governments.
55. Community resistance to federally subsidized housing projects is often
manifested in an allegation that the projects have not complied with section 102
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). See
e.g., Chick v. Hills, 528 F.2d 445 (1st Cir. 1976); Cedar-Riverside Environmental
Defense Fund v. Hills, 422 F. Supp. 294 (D. Minn. 1976); Schicht v. Romney, 372
F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
56. Prior to Rio Vista, the Minnesota Legislature had decided that low-in-
come housing should be assessed at 20% of market value. See text accompany-
ing note 3 supra. Arguably, this action represents the legislature's judgment
that low-income housing confers some peculiarly local benefits that municipali-
ties must pay for as a quid pro quo. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
By readjusting the assessed value of low-income housing from 20% of market
value to an effective rate of 0%, the court in Rio Vista contravened the legisla-
ture's judgment concerning the extent of peculiarly local benefits enjoyed by
municipalities having low-income housing projects within their borders.
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